Showing posts with label Competitive Market Structures. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Competitive Market Structures. Show all posts

Thursday, September 26, 2019

econlife - An Unusual Pizza Market by Elaine Schwartz



Nantucket’s pizza competition is very different from almost everywhere else.  I’ve been told that my favorite place for pizza, Pi Pizzeria, has a 50% market share. Meanwhile, the island’s other three or four restaurants that mostly make pizza split the other half.

Where are we going? To pizza markets.

Pizza Competition

In most of the U.S., the pizza market is about big and small. The big side is Domino’s and Pizza Hut. And yet, each of us could also name a small pizza restaurant located near us.

You can see that the big chains command more than half of the market:




Among the top 50 chains, Domino’s is #1 with global sales that total close to $12.25 billion while Pizza Hut, at approximately $12.03 billion is close behind. Then, with Little Caesar’s and Papa John’s in third and fourth place, we leap down to $4 billion each.

At the same time, the Independents’ slices of the pizza business are much smaller. Leading the Independents’ list, Marion’s Piazza’s nine units had 2018 sales of $21.31 million. Moving down the list, we quickly reach much smaller establishment groups with sales of less than $10 million.

Reading about the two groups, I got a very different sense of how they attract us. The larger chains are talking technology. They make online ordering easy and are experimenting with robotic delivery. Domino’s has even called itself an e-commerce company that sells pizza. At the same time, the Independents are benefiting from a more sophisticated pizza consumer that cares about fresh, local, and organic.

Here you can see that where you live determines the pizza you most prefer:




Our Bottom Line: Competitive Market Structures

As economists, we can return to our continuum of market structures where, moving from left to right, firms grow larger and more powerful. With perfect competition, we find markets populated by many small firms that produce almost identical products such as potatoes or asparagus. Next, monopolistic competition takes us to businesses that are somewhat larger like hair salons and supermarkets. Hair salons, for example, produce many of the same kinds of items (hair cuts) but have something distinctive (a certain stylist) that gives them some pricing power and product differentiation. Then with oligopoly we have several large firms that are dominant and finally, at the other end, just like the game, monopoly takes us to single firm dominance.

Pizza is in the monopolistic competition range.




But not Pi Pizza. When you produce incomparably delicious thin crust wood fired pies on an island, you wind up with more of a monopoly.

My sources and more: The 2019 Pizza Power Report and Pizza Today are good starting points for learning about pizza markets. I also recommend WSJ for more on Domino’s and Adage to confirm that Domino’s was #1 in the U.S. and globally.



Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Thursday, July 11, 2019

econlife - Throwback Thursday: When Google Was Just Google by Elaine Schwartz


#TBT: Today’s Google is the result of 270 acquisitions. Let’s look back at what it (and others like it) used to be and then forward to what we have now.


Google’s Growth Spurts

During the past 23 years, Google was first BackRub (very briefly), then Google (for close to 16 years), and now Alphabet. At first it was a unique search engine developed by two Stanford graduate students, Sergey Brin and Larry Page. Created in 1999, AdWords was an early idea that generated some of their first revenue. Five years later, slightly more than 19.6 million shares were sold publicly for $85 apiece through an IPO (Initial Public Offering).

An early homepage:




Since then, they’ve acquired 270 companies. Close to 63% of that total was for potential (and actual) competitors that included companies like Doubleclick (ads), YouTube (you know) and Waze (maps). Meanwhile 20% involved expanding into new areas like AI and robotics. The remainder is varied.

This NY Times graphic shows all of Google’s growth spurts. 2011 and 2014 were the most active acquisition years:




A Superstar Trend

As we look back to when Google was simply for search and now at its multiple identities, we see a trend in which fewer firms have more market power. Like Google, companies are getting larger. Goldman Sachs calls it the emergence of the superstars. According to Goldman Sachs research, the number of firms that trade in stock markets is down while their size is up. In 1996 there were 8000 listed firms; now there are closer to 4,000.


Our Bottom Line: Concentration

When economists talk about market power, they use the word concentration. In concentrated markets, there are fewer firms, they are large, they dominate sales, and they have some price making power. To quantify concentration, we can use a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The higher the HHI number, the greater the concentration. The Index can be based on different scales but typically the closer to 10,000, the greater the concentration.

Below you can see concentration from 20 industry groups for firms that are listed in the S&P. Tobacco is at the top while Interactive Media and Services are a close second:



If 10,000 is at the top of the the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, then 10,000 equals a monopoly. To calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index number, we can square the market share of each firm and then add them together. So, if a company is the only competitor, then its sales are 100% of the industry. The square of 100 is 10,000. However, if you have 100 firms, each with 1% of the shipments in an industry (or the sales, or for banks, perhaps the deposits), the HHI is 100:


12 + 12 + 12 + 12 + 96 other 12 = 100

When the U.S. Department of Justice uses the HHI to evaluate a merger proposal, it considers less than 1500 competitive, 1500-2500 moderately concentrated, and more than 2500, highly concentrated. Thinking of Alphabet (and Facebook), you can see why “interactive Media and Services is so concentrated.

My sources and more: The NY Times column on concentration and a (gated) Goldman Sachs report created the perfect synergy. As a final step, you might want to learn more about the HHI in an article from the St. Louis Fed and from the Department of Justice guidelines.



Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Wednesday, July 3, 2019

econlife - How To Get Speedier Fast Food by Elaine Schwartz


When you pull up to the  Naperville, Illinois McDonald’s drive thru, a voice says, ” Hey there, Welcome to McDonald’s. What would you like to order?”  Because it’s their voice recognition software, just be sure your daughter doesn’t shout from the back, “I want onion rings, Dad.” (This really is a problem—unless you plan to order them.)

Where are we going? To how McDonald’s competes.

Drive-Thru Speed

In 2012, average drive-thru time at McDonald’s was 188.83 seconds. Since then, adding  several seconds or more each year, the wait has gotten longer and longer. The reasons relate to more complexity, more accuracy, and more cars:



But still, McDonald’s has a problem. They know that compared to nine other fast-food chains, their wait is the longest. At the top for speed, Burger King was almost two minutes faster:



For now though, McDonald’s voice recognition software creates menus that reflect the weather and trendy items. It also encourages the extras like a donut stick with your McCafe. In the future, we can expect that employees will start an order while AI is still talking to the customer. We should eventually have more accuracy as data accumulates and recognition improves. But what really grabbed me was license plate scanning. Sort of like the barista who remembers your name and order, drive-thru technology might soon know what we want from our license plates.

Our Bottom Line: Monopolistic Competition

During the 1950s, a milk shake maker salesman named Ray Kroc realized that two brothers had unusually high milk shake sales. Visiting the McDonald brothers’ California roadside establishment, he saw how they speedily served a huge lunch time crowd with their version of mass production. Kroc bought their name, perfected the concept, and conquered a monopolistically competitive market. Because you just need a grill and hamburger meat, market entry is easy. We could say the same thing for a McDonald’s breakfast menu. But to be successful and have some price making power, you also require something unique—the monopolistic part. And that takes us to McDonald’s quest for the automation that achieves drive-thru speed, customizing, and accuracy as a product differentiator.

Along the following continuum, each McDonald’s restaurant would be close to monopolistic competition:



And speed has been one way that it has always competed.

My sources and more: The WSJ story on McDonald’s robots reminded me it was time to return to the drive thru and to QSR Magazine for the data. Then, if you want more about voice activation implementation and problems, this article had the detail (and was interesting) while Chicago media told about the Naperville restaurant. Finally, Yahoo Finance had the earnings call transcript where McDonald’s expressed its focus on drive-thru speed.



Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Thursday, May 30, 2019

econlife - The Rise and Fall of the Subway Five Dollar Footlong by Elaine Schwartz


The Subway footlong might never have been a foot long.

Six years ago, an Australian teenager posted on Facebook a picture of his 11-inch Subway Footlong. Feeling cheated (I guess), two New Jersey guys sued, others followed, and we wound up with a class action suit. Subway indicated the problem was frozen bread that had to be consistently stretched. They also said the slogan was an ad, not a promise.

In an initial settlement, Subway promised that they would implement new measures that guaranteed accuracy. They also agreed to pay a $520,000 legal tab and $500 to each of the ten people leading the suit. Explaining the small settlement the attorney said, “It was difficult to prove monetary damages, because everybody ate the evidence.”

But it didn’t end here. The litigation continued when yet another attorney who had nothing to do with the case said it was ridiculous. He explained that because only the lawyers made money, the decision should be thrown out. It was.

But so too was the footlong.

The Rise and Fall of the Footlong

In 2004, a Florida Subway franchisee figured out that a five dollar footlong would boost business. It was catchy, simple, cheap, and perfectly timed for a recession. At first local, by 2008, as the recession spread, the five dollar footlong did also.




Now though one store owner says the footlong costs him more than $4 to produce. In 2004 the margins were big. But, with $5.00 in 2004 the same as $7.00 today, inflation has sliced out the profit.

Our Bottom Line: Fast Food Competition

Subway’s biggest problem could be the competition. In 2019, everyone gives a discount, deli meat is no longer called healthy, and the name has become normal. Add all of that together and you get a monopolistically competitive firm that is less able to use the Five Dollar Footlong to differentiate itself.

Below, moving to the right on the market structure scale, firms become larger and more powerful. Meanwhile market entry and exit become increasingly difficult.




In a monopolistically competitive market, many firms compete for lots of customers, although firms sell similar sandwiches, they are able to achieve a bit of a “monopoly” by being different.

For Subway it was the footlong.

My sources and more: Thanks to the Planet Money Indicator podcast for alerting me to the demise of the footlong. Vox though had the whole story and Reuters, the end of the court case.

Please note that our featured image is from Subway and several sentences from today’s post were in a past econlife.


Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Thursday, December 6, 2018

econlife - Why the Republicans and Democrats Are Like Coke and Pepsi by Elaine Schwartz


Asked to name two firms that dominate an industry, we could start with Coke and Pepsi.  Next, we could add FedEx and UPS, or Boeing and Airbus, or Visa and MasterCard. There is one pair though that we should have included but did not.

The Republicans and the Democrats.

Two-Firm Power

Harvard’s Michael Porter is famous for using “five forces” to judge businesses’ competitive power. Now he tells us that they also can apply to politics. Just like the firm, we need to assess the power of buyers and suppliers. We should see if new entrants and substitute products are a threat. And lastly, we have to consider the rivalry among competitors.

In politics, Dr. Porter sees the two major parties competing during elections and when they govern. Among their five “buyer” groups are the primary voters, the average voters, and the non-voters. However, the largest blocs of voters aren’t the most important. Instead, it’s the primary voters and then the donors and the special interests.

Similarly, on the supply side, the major participants have considerable money and power. They include TV, cable, newspapers, social media, and the people who directly contact voters. At the federal level, spending on “supply” for the 2016 two-year election cycle was close to $16 billion. It generated approximately 19,000 jobs for lobbyists, campaign workers, consultants, and other staffers. There were close to 1,000 organizations with consulting contracts.

Meanwhile, there is little competition from upstart entrants and substitutes. Since the Republicans in 1854, we’ve had no new major political party. The Progressives (1912) and the Reform Party (1992) came and went. The reason? Size, money, connections with suppliers, and a recognizable “brand” are formidable entry barriers.

The Results

As an industry, politics is big business. But unlike other successful big businesses, they’ve preserved their power by catering to the extremes rather than the vast center:



Consequently, bipartisan cooperation has declined:



Our Bottom Line: Duopoly

An economist would blame it all on duopoly. As a market structure whose two dominant participants have considerable power, duopoly is responsible for how Coke and Pepsi and the Democrats and Republicans behave.


You can see below that duopoly is close to monopoly on a competitive market structure continuum. Located to the far right, duopoly is on the less competitive end of the spectrum where the firm (or the party) takes power away from the market:



My sources and more: Thanks to Freakonomics for a timely alert to the 2017 Michael Porter and Katherine Gehl paper.



Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Thursday, July 26, 2018

econlife - Solving McDonald’s Soggy French Fries Problem by Elaine Schwartz


Several months ago, McDonald’s said it had solved its soggy French fry problem. The firm assured a reporter that delivered fries would be crunchy. They just had to depart the restaurant when hot and fresh and arrive at our homes within 30 minutes.

For deliveries though, it might not be so easy.

We’ll start with McDonald’s first French fry problem…


A Consistent Crunch


Ray Kroc

One day in 1954, a curious milk shake maker salesman appeared at the McDonald’s restaurant near Pasadena, California. No one restaurant had ever before ordered ten of his Multi-mixers (simultaneously, each one could make five shakes). He personally wanted to see what hamburger restaurant could possibly require so many milk shakes.

The salesman’s name was Ray Kroc and he was amazed at what he observed. “Like ants at a picnic,” McDonald’s workers began their day carrying the meat and potatoes from a shed to the restaurant in a perfectly regimented fashion. They were dressed meticulously in trousers, white shirts, and hats. Close to opening time, lines of customers formed. When asked, many said they returned daily. Some left with bags full of the fifteen-cent hamburgers.

Immediately Ray Kroc grasped the potential of the McDonald’s operation. He asked the brothers if he could have the exclusive right to develop a national chain of McDonald’s franchises. “Yes,” was the answer (with much more negotiation) and the rest is history.

The French Fries

One of Kroc’s first problems was developing a consistent crunch for his French fries.  Although suppliers were providing the same russet potatoes and using precisely the same soaking and cooking techniques, still the franchises’ fries varied. Some would be perfect while others were too soggy.

After spending millions of dollars and hundreds of hours, McDonald’s researchers concluded that their storage and frying procedures needed tweaking. Storage time had to be three weeks—long enough for the sugars to turn to starches. Frying them, they had to be sure that the oil temperature did not rise more than three degrees above its lowest point. Then, with an electrical sensor maintaining the three-degree difference, they achieved a consistent McDonald’s crunch.


The Current Crunch


Maybe we should say déjà vu.

Now, McDonald’s seems to have an equally tough French fry problem.  Describing his French fries, an eater.com reporter wrote that the delivery had arrived within a half hour. However, only half were crispy and all were lukewarm.

Two days ago, the NY Times explained the solution in a lengthy article. Its focus was Lamb Weston, a McDonald’s French fry supplier. At one of its farms, Lamb Weston has been trying to figure out the kind of potato that would make a less limp fry. Concluding that water is the enemy, they’ve been using minimal irrigation through computers that monitor potatoes’ nutrient levels.

But that was only the beginning.

At the frying stage, they developed a new batter that, when combined with the new potatoes, will remain crunchy for almost an hour. (The current state-of-the-art is 12 minutes.) As you might imagine though, the fries’ journey from the restaurant to our homes could undo all. If that fry is placed next to a milk shake, both will wither. Appropriate ventilation and a moisture free environment are crucial. Ideally, they just need to put the French fries in a lightly folded paper bag.


Our Bottom Line: Monopolistic Competition


Last year, McDonald’s tested its delivery service in Florida. The next step was to offer it at 5,000 U.S. locations. Because they project a $100 billion market, you can see why a crispy French fry is so important.

French fries are their #1 delivery product:

McDonald’s_Says_It’s_Solved_the_Industry’s_Delivery_Problem_of_Keeping_Fries_Hot_-_Bloomberg

As economists we can say that McDonald’s is trying to achieve product differentiation. Especially because they compete in a monopolistically competitive market, they have to make themselves better than other restaurants. As a market structure with many smaller firms that can easily enter and exit, monopolistic competition means that McDonald’s needs to stand out.


Edit_Post_‹_Econlife_—_WordPress

Having crunchy French fry deliveries would help.

My sources and more: Thanks to the NY Times for alerting me to the leap forward in French fry crunch technology. Then, Bloomberg and Eater had the McDonald’s facts as did excerpts from my Econ 101 1/2 about Ray Kroc.

Please note that today’s featured picture is from Eater.com.

Hazlegrove-6763_6b
Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Tuesday, April 17, 2018

econlife - What We Don’t Know About Dirt by Elaine Schwartz


Next time you go to a Major League Baseball game or even a local stadium, take a good look at the infield. There’s no such thing as normal dirt anymore.

Where are we going? To how dirt dealers compete for baseball business.

But first, some infield insight…


How Dirt Differs


Our story starts at Slippery Rock University. Located in Western Pennsylvania, the school needed an infield for its new baseball stadium. A nearby dirt dealer, who had never done an infield before, got the job. But then he had to figure out which dirt to use. Bringing samples to the field, he appears to have wound up with a unique silt, clay, and sand mixture.

You can imagine what the goals are. You don’t want “a trail of chunks” from baserunners. You want the surface to remain smooth so the ball doesn’t take some weird hops. Meanwhile the pitcher needs a gloppier mix for a more secure foothold. And then there’s the weather. With a sufficiently absorbent surface, you can minimize the rain delays and cancellations.

DuraEdge Products was the Pennsylvania firm with a new dirt recipe. From Slippery Rock, their business expanded to the Philadelphia Phillies and to other Major League stadiums. The following map shows some teams that have their infields:


Why_Western_Pennsylvania_dirt_is_used_in_the_infields_of_most_MLB_stadiums___Pittsburgh_Post-Gazette-3


Our Bottom Line: Monopolistic Competition


In monopolistically competitive markets, small and medium size firms sell very similar products. So it makes sense that they try to differentiate themselves. If you are in the infield surface business, then you might say your clay is unusual or your silt is special. Your goal is to move to the right on a competitive market structure continuum to get some pricing power:

Edit_Post_‹_Econlife_—_WordPress-2

The result? Even dirt can provide a competitive advantage.

My sources and more: Since we’ve already looked at sand, I was curious about this WSJ article on dirt. And that took me to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

Hazlegrove-6763_6b
Ideal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz’s work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

Thursday, December 14, 2017

econlife - A Closer Look at the Digitization in Our Lives by Elaine Schwartz


Recorded music used to start with a label and an artist. The production process was expensive because of the skilled technicians and the sophisticated equipment. Add to that a music video, the physical album, the distribution process, and what do you get? For a new artist, the tab is $1 million and the success, unlikely.

But then came digitization…and The Piano Guys:


 For this one video, so far, there have been 62.5 million views.
And a considerable shift in market behavior.

The Digital Impact


Looking at music, movies and books, we can see a seismic shift because of digitization.

McKinsey concluded that the media were the digitization leaders:

Five_Fifty__The_digital_effect___McKinsey___Company-1











Summarizing a huge body of digitization research, we can say that supply side costs are down–with marginal costs as low as zero. And on the consumer side, we have an increase in welfare as choice and potential quality skyrocket.

Some of the changes relate to sinking production costs. As a musician, an artist or a writer, you once needed an agent just to sign a contract. No more. Now, do-it-yourself lets you bypass the gatekeepers.

We have also seen the distribution revolution as online media supply what we used to buy exclusively from record and book stores, and movie theaters. In 2012, there were 550 films released through movie theaters. By the next year, Netflix alone had 1058.

For the media, you can see the whopping increase:
How_Digitization_Has_Created_a_Golden_Age_of_Music__Movies__Books__and_Television

















Our Bottom Line: Market Structures


Let’s just conclude with a look at our market structure continuum. On the left, we have smaller less powerful firms that can easily enter and exit markets. Meanwhile, moving rightward, pricing power and firm size increase.

Digitization is upsetting our traditional market structure order. In some markets we have more competitors. Because of easy entry and exit, digitization is adding more of the characteristics of monopolistic competition. Also though, thinking of Amazon, some firms have much more pricing power, taking us to the right side of the scale.

Competitive-Market-Structures-Continuum





Maybe though we should remove our economic lenses and simply enjoy the Piano Guys.

My sources and more: Always selecting interesting topics, economist Joel Waldfogel now has a paper on digitization in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Also, I discovered  this NBER paper that complemented his analysis. Finally, you might enjoy looking at McKinsey (as did I) here and here, with its real life examples.

Hazlegrove-6763_6bIdeal for the classroom, econlife.com reflects Elaine Schwartz's work as a teacher and a writer. As a teacher at the Kent Place School in Summit, NJ, she’s been an Endowed Chair in Economics and chaired the history department. She’s developed curricula, was a featured teacher in the Annenberg/CPB video project “The Economics Classroom,” and has written several books including Econ 101 ½ (Avon Books/Harper Collins). You can get econlife on a daily basis! Head to econlife.

econlife - Who Will Sacrifice Civil Liberties During a Pandemic? by Elaine Schwartz

  In a new NBER paper, a group of Harvard and Stanford scholars investigated how much of our civil liberties we would trade for better heal...